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Abstract
Diﬀerential privacy is a promising approach to privacy preserving data analysis with a well-developed theory
for functions. Despite recent work on implementing systems that aim to provide diﬀerential privacy, the
problem of formally verifying that these systems have diﬀerential privacy has not been adequately addressed.
We develop a formal probabilistic automaton model of diﬀerential privacy for systems by adapting prior
work on diﬀerential privacy for functions. We present the ﬁrst sound veriﬁcation technique for proving
diﬀerential privacy of interactive systems. The technique is based on a form of probabilistic bisimulation
relation. The novelty lies in the way we track quantitative privacy leakage bounds using a relation family
instead of a single relation. We illustrate the proof technique on a representative automaton motivated by
PINQ, an implemented system that is intended to provide diﬀerential privacy. Surprisingly, our analysis
yields a privacy leakage bound of (2t ∗ ) rather than (t ∗ ) when -diﬀerentially private functions are called
t times. The extra leakage arises from accounting for bounded memory constraints of real computers.
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1 Introduction
Diﬀerential Privacy. Diﬀerential privacy is a promising approach to privacy-
preserving data analysis (see [14,16] for surveys). This work is motivated by statis-
tical data sets that contain personal information about a large number of individuals
(e.g., census or health data). In such a scenario, a trusted party collects personal
information from a representative sample with the goal of releasing statistics about
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the underlying population while simultaneously protecting the privacy of the indi-
viduals. In an interactive setting, an untrusted data examiner poses queries that
the trusted party evaluates over the data set and appropriately modiﬁes to protect
privacy before sending the result to the examiner.
Diﬀerential privacy formalizes this operation in terms of a probabilistic san-
itization function that takes the data set as input. Diﬀerential privacy requires
that the probability of producing an output should not change much irrespective of
whether information about any particular individual is in the data set or not. The
amount of change is measured in terms of a privacy leakage bound—a non-negative
real number , where a smaller  indicates a higher level of privacy. The insight
here is that since only a limited amount of additional privacy risk is incurred by
joining a data set, individuals may decide to join the data set if there are societal
beneﬁts from doing so (e.g., aiding cancer research). A consequence and strength
of the deﬁnition is that the privacy guarantee holds irrespective of the auxiliary
information and computational power available to an adversary. Previous work on
algorithms for sanitization functions and the analysis of these algorithms in light
of the trade-oﬀs between privacy and utility (answering useful queries accurately
without compromising privacy) has provided ﬁrm foundations for diﬀerential pri-
vacy (e.g. [17,13,30,34,6,14,15,20,16,18]).
In a diﬀerent direction, these sanitization algorithms are being implemented
for inclusion in data management systems. For example, pinq resembles a sql
database, but instead of providing the actual answer to sql queries, it provides
the output of a diﬀerentially private sanitization function operating on the actual
answer [29]. Another such system, airavat, manages distributed data and per-
forms MapReduce computations in a cloud computing environment while using
diﬀerential privacy as a basis for declassifying data in a mandatory access control
framework [39]. Both of these are interactive systems that use sanitization func-
tions as a component: they interact with both the providers of sensitive data and
untrusted data examiners, store the data, and perform computations on the data
some of which apply sanitization functions.
Even if we assume that these systems correctly implement the sanitization func-
tions to give diﬀerential privacy, this is not suﬃcient to conclude that the guarantees
of diﬀerential privacy apply to the system as a whole. For the diﬀerential privacy
guarantee of functions to scale to the whole of the implemented system, the system
must properly handle the sensitive data and never provide channels through which
untrusted examiners can infer information about it without ﬁrst sanitizing it to the
degree dictated by the privacy error bound.
Formal Methods for Diﬀerential Privacy. We work toward reconciling
formal analysis techniques with the growing body of work on abstract frameworks
or implemented systems that use diﬀerential privacy as a building block. While
prior work in the area has provided a type system for proving that a non-interactive
program is a diﬀerentially private sanitization function [38], we know of no formal
methods that can, in addition, prove that an interactive system using such functions
has diﬀerential privacy. Applying formal methods to interactive systems ensures
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that these systems properly manage their data bases and interactions with untrusted
users.
We work with a special class of probabilistic I/O automata that allow us to
model interactive systems in terms of states and probabilistic transitions between
states. These automata provide us with the needed expressive power for model-
ing how data is stored in an internal state of an implementation, and how it is
updated through computations, some of which apply diﬀerentially private saniti-
zation functions on data. We present this probabilistic automaton model and our
diﬀerential privacy deﬁnition for probabilistic automata, which we call diﬀerential
noninterference due to the similarities it has with the information ﬂow property
noninterference [21]. Indeed, when applied to interactive systems, both diﬀerential
privacy and noninterference privacy aim at restricting information leakage about
sensitive data by requiring that the system produces similar outputs for inputs that
diﬀer only in sensitive data. However, diﬀerential privacy allows for the degree of
similarity to decrease as the inputs diverge, making it a more ﬂexible requirement.
Our main technical contribution is a proof technique for establishing diﬀerential
non-interference guarantees for programs implementing sanitization functions (such
as the Truncated Geometric Mechanism [20]) and of interactive systems that use
such functions as building blocks. Our technique allows the global property of
diﬀerential noninterference to be proved from local information about transitions
between states. This proof technique was inspired by the unwinding proof technique
originally developed for proving that a system has noninterference [22].
Our unwinding technique is also similar to bisimulation-based proof techniques
as both uses a notion of “similarity” of states with respect to their observable
behavior. Unlike traditional bisimulation relations for probabilistic automata, the
unwinding relation is deﬁned over the states of a single automaton with the intention
of establishing the similarity of two states where one is obtainable from the other
by the input of an additional data point. Moreover, the notion of similarity is
approximate, which is in keeping with the deﬁnition of diﬀerential privacy. An
unwinding proof involves ﬁnding a relation family indexed by the set of possible
values of the privacy leakage bound , rather than a single relation. This departure
from traditional probabilistic bisimulations is needed to track the maximum privacy
leakage tolerable from a given state in the execution. We prove the soundness of our
proof technique: the existence of appropriate -unwinding families for an automaton
M implies that M has -diﬀerential noninterference.
We illustrate the proof technique on a representative automaton motivated by
PINQ, an implemented system that is intended to provide diﬀerential privacy. Sur-
prisingly, our analysis yields a privacy leakage bound of (2t ∗ ) rather than (t ∗ )
when -diﬀerentially private functions are called t times. The extra leakage arises
from accounting for bounded memory constraints of real computers.
An earlier version of this work [44], in addition to the unwinding proof technique,
considers asynchronous systems in which queries are not necessarily answered in the
order in which they are posed and demonstrates that this additional ﬂexibility has
subtle consequences for diﬀerential privacy. Further details of this line of work,
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including deﬁnitions and results related to compositional reasoning and automation
of our proof technique can be found in our related technical report [45].
2 Background
2.1 Diﬀerential Privacy
Diﬀerential privacy formalizes the idea that a private process should not reveal too
much information about a single person. A data point represents all the information
collected about an individual (or other entity that must be protected). A multiset
(bag) of data points forms a data set. A sanitization function κ processes the data
set and returns a result to the untrusted data examiner that should probabilistically
not change whether or not a single data point is in the data set. Dwork [13] states
diﬀerential privacy as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Diﬀerential Privacy] A randomized function κ has -diﬀerential
privacy iﬀ for all data sets B1 and B2 diﬀering on at most one element, and for all
S ⊆ range(κ),
Pr[κ(B1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() ∗ Pr[κ(B2) ∈ S]
Formally, multisets B1 and B2 diﬀer on at most one element iﬀ either B1 = B2
or there exists d such that B1 ∪ {d} = B2 or B2 ∪ {d} = B1.
Privacy Mechanisms. As shown in the original work on diﬀerential privacy,
given a statistic f that can be computed of the data sets Bi, one can construct a
sanitization function κf from f by having κf add noise to the value of f(Bi) where
the noise is drawn from a Laplace distribution [17]. This is an example of a privacy
mechanism, a scheme for converting a statistic into a sanitization function with
diﬀerential privacy.
Systems in practice would implement a sanitization function such as κf as a
program. As actual computers have only a bounded amount of memory, the pro-
gram computing κf must only use a bounded amount of memory. However, many
sanitization functions proposed in the diﬀerential privacy literature, including all
sanitization functions constructed using the Laplace privacy mechanism, use ran-
domly drawn real numbers, which requires an uncountably inﬁnite number of states.
While such functions can be approximated using a ﬁnite number of states (e.g., by
using ﬂoating point numbers), it is unclear whether the proofs that these functions
have diﬀerential privacy carry over to their approximations.
As we are interested in formally proving that ﬁnite systems provide diﬀerential
privacy, we limit ourselves to privacy mechanisms that operate over only a ﬁnite
number of values. One such mechanism is the Truncated Geometric Mechanism of
Ghosh et al. [20], which uses noise drawn from a bounded, discrete version of the
Laplace distribution.
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01 dPts:= emptyArray(t);
02 numPts := emptyArray(t);
03 for(j:=0; j<t; j++)
04 dPts[j]:= emptyArray(maxPts);
05 numPts[j] := 0;
06 curSlot:=0;
07 while(1)
08 y:=input();
09 if(datapoint(y))
10 if(numPts[curSlot]<maxPts)
11 dPts[curSlot][numPts[curSlot]]:=y;
12 numPts[curSlot]++;
13 else
14 k:=get_sanitization_funct(y);
15 res:=k.compute(dPts);
16 print(res);
17 curSlot:=(curSlot + 1) mod t;
18 delete dPts[curSlot];
19 dPts[curSlot] := emptyArray(maxPts);
20 numPts[curSlot] := 0
Fig. 1. Program that tracks data point usage to ensure diﬀerential noninterference
2.2 Motivating Example System
To further motivate and illustrate our work, we provide an example of an interactive
system that uses sanitization functions. The system manages data points entered by
data providers and processes requests of data examiners for information by receiving
queries and answering them after sanitizing the answer computed over the data set.
The system must apply the sanitization functions to the data set and interact with
the data examiner in a manner that does not compromise privacy.
Possible source code for one such system is shown in Figure 1. To be concrete,
suppose that the data points are integers and the system handles only two queries.
The ﬁrst produces the output of the sanitization function count, which provides
the number of data points currently in the data base. The second produces the
output of sum, which provides their sum. In both cases, the sanitization functions
use the Truncated Geometric Mechanism to preserve privacy [20].
Intuitively, the program in Figure 1 keeps an array of t arrays of data points and
a variable curSlot, whose value indicates a (current) slot in the array. If the input
is a data point, that data point is added to the array indexed by curSlot unless
that array is full, in which case the data point is ignored.
If the input is a query, then the query requested by the input is computed on
the union of all the data points collected from all the arrays. Line 15 uses either the
implementation of count or sum to compute the system’s response to the query y
where Line 14 selects the correct function. Furthermore, the index curSlot to one
of these arrays is cyclically shifted and the array to which it now points is replaced
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with an empty array. Since there are only t slots, this means that each array will
only last for t queries before being deleted. (If t = 0, we take the program to have
an array dPts of length 0, in which case it never stores any data points.) Since
each query has -diﬀerential privacy, this ensures that each data point will only be
involved in t ∗  worth of queries.
Veriﬁcation. The goal of our work is to formally verify that systems like this
one preserve the privacy of their users. In addition to showing that the sanitization
functions count and sum have diﬀerential privacy (a subject of previous work [20]),
we study how the system leaks information about the data points in ways other
than through the outputs from these functions. Indeed, one might expect from the
sequential result for diﬀerential privacy discussed above [30, Corollary 5], that the
system would provide (t ∗ )-diﬀerential privacy. However, due to how the system
manages data points, it actually only provides (2t∗)-diﬀerential privacy as we show
later.
Had our goal only been to formally verify the implementations of the sanitization
functions count and sum, it would suﬃce to use a simple formal model such as
that of probabilistic ﬁnite-state automata with no interaction and use a suitable
algorithmic technique to verify diﬀerential privacy, which research on Markov chains
provides.
However, to verify diﬀerential privacy for interactive systems that use privacy
mechanism as a building block as the above system does, we need a more expressive
formal model that models the interaction of the data examiner with the system and
the addition of data points to the system over time. The next section provides such
a model.
3 Modeling Interaction for Formal Veriﬁcation
In this section, we present the basics of the formal framework we use in modeling
interactive systems and show how we can model the example system of Section 2.2
using this formalism. Speciﬁcally, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we introduce a special
class of probabilistic I/O automata and present our deﬁnition of diﬀerential privacy
for this class of probabilistic I/O automata. In Section 3.3 we model the program
of Figure 1 as a probabilistic I/O automaton.
3.1 Automata
We use a simpliﬁed version of probabilistic I/O automata (cf. [25]). We deﬁne an
automaton in terms of a probabilistic labeled transition system (plts).
Deﬁnition 3.1 A probabilistic labeled transition system (plts) is a tuple L =
〈S, I,O,→〉 where S is a countable set of states; I and O are countable and pairwise
disjoint sets of actions, referred to as input and output actions respectively; and
→ ⊆ S × (I ∪O)×Disc(S) represents the possible transitions where Disc(S) is the
set of discrete probability measures over S.
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We use A for I ∪O. We partition the input set I into D, the set of data points,
and Q, the set of queries. We also partition the output set O into R, the set of
responses to the data examiner’s queries and H, the set of outputs that are hidden
from (not observable to) the data examiner. Note that H includes outputs to the
data provider. We let E range over all actions to which the examiner has direct
access: E = Q ∪R. When only one automaton is under consideration, we denote a
transition 〈s, a, μ〉 ∈ → by s
a
→μ.
Henceforth, we require that pltss satisfy the following conditions:
• Transition determinism: For every state s ∈ S and action a ∈ A, there is at most
one μ ∈ Disc(S) such that s
a
→μ.
• Output determinism: For every state s ∈ S, output o ∈ O, action a ∈ A, and
μ ∈ Disc(S), if s
o
→μ and s
a
→μ′, then a = o and μ′ = μ.
• Quasi-input enabling: For every state s ∈ S, inputs i1 and i2 in I, and μ1 ∈
Disc(S), if s
i1→μ1, then there exists μ2 such that s
i2→μ2.
Output determinism and quasi-input enabling means that the state space may be
partitioned into two parts: states that accept all of the inputs and states that pro-
duce exactly one output. We require that each output producing state produces
only one output since the choice of output should be made by the plts to avoid non-
determinism that might be resolved in a way that leaks information about the data
set. Owing to transition determinism, we will often write s
a
→μ without explicitly
quantifying μ.
We deﬁne an extended transition relation ⇒ that describes how a plts may
perform a sequence of actions where some of the output actions are hidden from the
data examiner. In particular, the hidden outputs in H model unobservable internal
actions irrelevant to privacy. To deﬁne ⇒, let a state that produces an output from
H be called H-enabled and one that does not be called H-disabled. By output
determinism, H-enabled states may only transition under an action in H and, thus,
cannot have transitions on actions from R ∪ Q ∪D. To skip over such states and
focus on H-disabled states, which are more interesting from a veriﬁcation point of
view, we deﬁne ⇒ to show to which H-disabled states the system may transition
while performing any ﬁnite number of hidden actions. We deﬁne s
a
⇒ ν so that ν(s′)
is the probability of reaching the H-disabled state s′ from the state s where a is the
action performed from state s. Note that ν is not a distribution over the set S of
states since the automaton might execute an inﬁnite sequence of H-enabled states
never reaching an H-disabled state. We let ν be a distribution over S⊥ = S ∪ {⊥}
where ⊥ /∈ S represents nontermination and ν(⊥) = 1 −
∑
s∈S ν(s). Note that for
no a, μ, or ν does ⊥
a
→μ or ⊥
a
⇒ ν.
A plts L combined with a state s deﬁnes a probabilistic I/O automaton 〈L, s〉.
This state is thought of as the initial state of the automaton or the current state
of the plts. We deﬁne a trace to be a sequence of actions from A∗ ∪ Aω. Given
such an automaton M , we deﬁne M to be a function from input sequences to the
random variable over traces that describes how the automaton M behaves under the
inputs i. We let M(i)E denote the random variable over sequences of actions
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observable to the data examiner obtained by projecting only the actions in E from
the trace returned by random variable M(i).
To deal with nontermination, we note that the examiner can only observe ﬁnite
preﬁxes of any nonterminating trace. When the examiner sees the ﬁnite preﬁxes of a
trace, he must consider all traces of the system with the observed preﬁx as possible.
(The set of these traces has been called a cone — see e.g. [25].) Since the examiner
may only see actions in E, these sets are in one-to-one correspondence with E∗.
Thus, the examiner observing some event is not modeled as the probability of the
system producing a trace in some set, but rather with the probability of a system
producing a preﬁx of trace in some set. That is, rather than using Pr[M(i)E ∈ S]
for S ⊆ E∗ ∪ Eω, we need Pr[M(i)E  S] for S ⊆ E
∗ where  is the super-
sequence-equal operator raised to work over sets in the following manner: e  S iﬀ
there exists e′ ∈ S such that e  e′ where e ∈ E∗ ∪Eω and S ⊆ E∗.
3.2 Diﬀerential Noninterference
Often the data set of a diﬀerentially private system is loaded over time and may
change between queries. Such changes in the data set are not explicitly modeled
by the deﬁnition of diﬀerential privacy, but one could conceive of modeling such
changes by having data points be time-indexed sequences of data. Nevertheless,
for formal veriﬁcation, we require an explicit model of data set mutation. Thus,
we present a version of diﬀerential privacy deﬁned in terms of the behavior of an
automaton that accepts both queries and data points over time.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Diﬀerential Noninterference] An automaton M has -diﬀerential
noninterference if for all input sequences i1 and i2 in I
∗ diﬀering on at most one
data point, and for all S ⊆ E∗,
Pr[M(i1)E  S] ≤ exp() ∗ Pr[M(i2)E  S]
where we say two input sequences diﬀer by one data point if one of the sequences
may be constructed from the other by inserting a single data point anywhere in it.
By restricting the traces ofM to only those elements of E = Q∪R, we limit traces
to only those actions accessible to the untrusted data examiner. The deﬁnition
requires that any subset of such traces be almost equally probable under the input
sequences i1 and i2, which diﬀer by at most one data point. Note that like the
original form of diﬀerential privacy, we do not model the adversary explicitly but
rather consider the behavior of the automaton over all possible input sequences the
adversary could supply.
3.3 Example: Automaton Model for Program of Figure 1
To eventually prove that the program of Figure 1 has (2t ∗ )-diﬀerential noninter-
ference, we ﬁrst give an automaton model of the program, called Mex1(K). Note
that the model we give here is parametric in the set of sanitization functions; it
applies not only to the program of Figure 1, which assumes K = {count, sum}
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but to any other instance of the same program that uses a possibly diﬀerent set of
sanitization functions (modeled by the parameter K). We deﬁne below the state
space S and transition relation →, which determine Lex1(K) = 〈S, I,O,→〉 for ev-
ery set K of sanitization functions. Using an initial state s0, we get the automaton
Mex1(K) = 〈Lex1(K), s0〉.
States. Each state of the automaton can be viewed as a particular valuation
of the variables in the program allowed by its type. We model the array dPts as a
t-tuple of multisets of data points. We model numPts as a t-tuple of integers ranging
from 0 to v where v is the value held by the constant maxPts. We model the index
curSlot as an integer c ranging from 0 to t− 1, which selects one of the multisets
of the t-tuple. The variable y stores the most recent input. The variable res keeps
track of which output from O is about to be produced and the sanitization function
is stored in k. The state must also keep track of a program counter pc, which
ranges over the program line numbers from 01 to 20. Thus, the set of states S is
{01, . . . , 20} × (bag(D))t × {0, . . . , v}t × {0, . . . , t − 1} × I × O ×K where bag(D)
is the set of all multisets with elements from D and K is the set of sanitization
functions.
Actions. We model the input command in the source code with the input
action set I of our automaton: for each possible value that input can return there
is an input action in I corresponding to that value. Inputs in the code can be
either queries or data points, which is modeled by the partition of the set I into
the sets Q for queries and D for data points. We model the print command in the
source code with the observable outputs R (responses) of our automaton. For each
possible value that can be printed we have an output action in R. We model all
other commands by internal (hidden) actions.
Transitions. We list below only those transitions that are interesting for our
purposes. That is, transitions on actions from the sets I and R, and transitions on
hidden actions that represent internal computation such as choosing of an appropri-
ate sanitization function for a given query and computation of the result using that
function. We use the symbol τ for hidden actions. We also use Dirac distributions:
let Dirac(s) be the distribution such that Pr[Dirac(s)=s] = 1 and Pr[Dirac(s)=s′] = 0
for all s′ = s. Given a query q in Q, we let κq be the sanitization function that
answers that query. Some key transitions are:
Input 〈08,B,n, c, y, r, k〉
i
→Dirac(〈09,B,n, c, i, r, k〉)
Choose Function 〈14,B,n, c, y, r, k〉
τ
→Dirac(〈15,B,n, c, y, r, κy〉)
Compute Function 〈15, 〈B0, . . . , Bt−1〉,n〉, c, y, r, k〉
τ
→μ where
μ(〈16, 〈B0, . . . , Bt−1〉,n, c, y, r
′, k〉) = Pr[k(
t−1⊎
=0
B) = r
′]
using unionmulti for multiset union and μ(s′) = 0 for states not of that form, and
Output Result 〈16,B,n, c, y, r, k〉
r
→Dirac(〈17,B,n, c, y, r, k〉)
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The third transition above is a probabilistic transition that represents the in-
ternal computation of a sanitization function k on the union of the multisets
B0, . . . , Bt−1. The eﬀect of the transition is to update the value of the pc from
15 to 16 and to update the result to be output from r to a new value r′ such that
the probability of ending up in state 〈16, 〈B1, . . . , Bt〉, c, n, y, r
′, k〉 as a result of the
transition is Pr[k(
⊎t
=1B) = r
′].
From these transitions, we can calculate the extended transitions for each of the
three types of H-disabled states:
Drop 〈08,B,n, c, y, r, k〉
d
⇒Dirac(〈08,B,n, c, d, r, k〉) when nc of n is v;
Add 〈08,B,n, c, y, r, k〉
d
⇒Dirac(〈08,B ′,n′, c, d, r, k〉) when nc of n is less than
v and B′ and n′ are such that B′c = Bc unionmulti {d}, n
′
c = nc + 1, and for all c
′ = c,
B′c′ = Bc′ and n
′
c′ = nc′ ;
Answer Query 〈08, 〈B0, . . . , Bt−1〉,n, c, y, r, k〉
q
⇒ ν where
ν(〈16, 〈B0, . . . , Bt−1〉,n, c, q, r
′, κq〉) = Pr[k(
t−1⊎
=0
B) = r
′]
and ν(s′) = 0 for states not of that form; and
Delete Old Data 〈16,B,n, c, y, r, k〉
r
⇒Dirac(〈08,B ′,n, c, y, r, k〉)
where we have B′c+1 mod t = { } , n
′
c+1 mod t = 0, and for all c
′′ = c + 1 mod t,
B′c′′ = Bc′′ and n
′
c′′ = nc′′ using { } for the empty multiset.
The third extended transition above represents a sequence of transitions that
starts with the input of a query q. The input of the query is followed by transitions
on hidden actions that model the computation of the answer to the query where
some of these hidden steps are probabilistic. The resulting state has the property
that κq has been chosen as the sanitization function and that pc = 16, which implies
that the resulting state is H-disabled and the automaton is ready to perform an
observable output by outputing the answer to the query.
The state space S and transition relation → determines the plts Lex1(K) =
〈S, I,O,→〉 for every set K of diﬀerentially private functions. Using the initial
state s0 = 〈1, { }
t, 0t, 1, y0, r0, k0〉, we get the automaton Mex1(K) = 〈Lex1(K), s0〉.
(The initial values y0, r0, k0 do not matter since they will be replaced before being
used.)
4 Unwinding Proof Technique
We desire a technique for drawing conclusions about the global behavior (execu-
tions) of the system from local aspects (states, actions, and transitions) of the
model. Faced with a similar situation, Goguen and Meseguer introduced unwinding
relations to simplify proving that a system has noninterference [22]. We present
a similar technique for proving that a system has diﬀerential noninterference. In
particular we state what it means for a relation family to be an unwinding family
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and prove Theorem 4.5, which roughly states that the existence of an unwinding
family for a given automaton implies that it satisﬁes diﬀerential noninterference.
Our unwinding notion is probabilistic and approximate, which is in keeping with
the notion of diﬀerential privacy. The novelty lies in the way we keep track of the
privacy leakage bound, which evolves as the system evolves where the evolution is
constrained by the diﬀerential privacy deﬁnition.
4.1 Deﬁnition and Soundness
Formulating a notion of unwinding relation that is sound for showing diﬀerential
noninterference is more complicated than existing notions for showing noninterfer-
ence because we must deal with probabilities and we must keep track of the privacy
leakage bound . To deal with probabilities and approximation, we adapt the notion
of approximate lifting from previous work on approximate probabilistic simulation
relations in the context of cryptographic protocols [42]. However, such work does
not deal with tracking a leakage bound (see Section 5 for additional details). Thus,
we introduce a family of unwinding relations indexed by various amounts of privacy
leakage. Each unwinding relation in the family is a relation on the state space of the
automaton. The unwinding relation indexed by the leakage amount  relates states
that exhibit approximately the same trace distributions in the sense of -diﬀerential
noninterference.
To deal with probabilities in a concise and modular way, we ﬁrst deﬁne an
approximate lifting operation that takes a relation over sets and produces a relation
over distributions on those sets. The degree of approximation is governed by a
parameter δ.
Deﬁnition 4.1 [δ-Approximate Lifting] Let R be a relation between a set X and
a set Y . The δ-approximate lifting of R denoted by L(R, δ) is the relation between
Disc(X) and Disc(Y ) such that for all ν1 in Disc(X) and ν2 in Disc(Y ), ν1 L(R, δ) ν2
if and only if there exists a bijection β : Supp(ν1) → Supp(ν2) such that for all x in
Supp(ν1), x R β(x) and | ln ν1(x)− ln ν2(β(x))| ≤ δ.
The requirement for β to be from the support set of ν1 to the support set of ν2
ensures that if a state is assigned a non-zero probability in ν1 then it is not possible
for a related state to be assigned a zero probability in ν2 and vice versa—there is one
to one correspondence between the states with non-zero and identical probabilities
in the two distributions. The form of δ involves natural logarithms because the
privacy leakage bound in the diﬀerential privacy deﬁnition appears in the exponent.
Next we deﬁne our unwinding technique, which is illustrated in Figure 2. Intu-
itively, since we want the behavior of the automaton to change only by a factor of
 on receiving a single data point, we want the transitions under a data point from
a state s to lead to states s′ that are only a factor of  diﬀerent from s. Covering
(Deﬁnition 4.4) formalizes this by requiring that state s is related to each such state
s′ by a relation R that is part of an -unwinding family (Deﬁnition 4.2).
In more detail, an -unwinding family starts with a privacy leakage budget of ,
which decreases over time to a current balance of ′. Related states s1 and s2 are
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s2
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′
−δ, δ)
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R
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a
Fig. 2. Unwinding Family and Covering: The left side shows the requirements for a covering. The right side
shows the requirements placed on an unwinding family. The solid arrows denote the extended transition
relation ⇒ and clouds depict probability distributions such as ν where s′ ∈ Supp(ν).
required to only make transitions under the same actions. The distributions ν1 and
ν2 that result from these transitions followed by any number of transitions under
hidden outputs may diﬀer only by a factor of δ. This diﬀerence is subtracted from
the current balance ′ to get a new current balance. Once the balance reaches zero,
the resulting distributions must be equivalent. As the balance started at , only a
total of  privacy can be leaked, a point proved in Lemma 4.3.
Deﬁnition 4.2 [-Unwinding Family] For a non-negative real number , a family
indexed by the set [0, ] of relations R· over the H-disabled states of a plts L is
an -unwinding family for L if for all ′ in [0, ], for all x1 and x2 in S⊥ such that
x1 R
′ x2, for all a in I ∪R, there exists ν1 such that x1
a
⇒ ν1 iﬀ there exists ν2 such
that x2
a
⇒ ν2, and when they do exist, there exists a real number δ in [0, 
′] such
that ν1 L(R
′−δ, δ) ν2.
Lemma 4.3 For all -unwinding families R·, all ′ in [0, ], all x1 and x2 in S⊥
such that x1 R
′ x2, all i in I
∗, and all e in E∗, both
Pr[ 〈L, x1〉(i)E  e ] ≤ exp(
′) Pr[ 〈L, x2〉(i)E  e ] and
Pr[ 〈L, x2〉(i)E  e ] ≤ exp(
′) Pr[ 〈L, x1〉(i)E  e ].
The above lemma shows that two states related by an -unwinding family, given
the same input sequence, produce distributions that only deviate by a factor .
Thus, to maintain -diﬀerential noninterference, we desire that a state s should
upon receiving a single data point d transition to a state s′ that can be put into an
-unwinding family with s. We formalize this intuition with the next deﬁnition and
conﬁrm it with the following theorem.
Deﬁnition 4.4 [Covers] We say that an -unwinding family R· for a plts L covers
a state s and data point d of L if s
d
⇒ ν implies that ν(⊥) = 0 and for all s′ ∈ Supp(ν),
s R s′.
Theorem 4.5 For an automaton M = 〈L, s0〉, if for all H-disabled states s reach-
able from s0 and all data points d, there exists a -unwinding family that covers s
and d, then M has -diﬀerential noninterference.
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Our related technical report [45] holds the proofs of Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.5.
We prove Lemma 4.3 by induction over the structure of a. The interesting cases
arise when a is of the form i:a′ for i ∈ I or o:a′ for o ∈ O, which require similar
reasoning. Suppose that a = i:a′ and s1
i
⇒ ν1 for some i ∈ I. By the unwinding
relation, we know that there exists a transition s2
i
⇒ ν2 such that ν1 and ν2 are in
keeping with the privacy leakage bound imposed by the unwinding relation. Then
for states s′1 ∈ Supp(ν1), and s
′
2 ∈ Supp(ν2), we apply the inductive hypothesis for
a
′ to obtain the result.
To prove Theorem 4.5, we show for all i1, i2, and e where Δ(i1, i2) = 1 that
Pr[〈L, s〉(i1)Ee] ≤ exp() Pr[〈L, s〉(i2)Ee]. We use proof by induction
over i1, i2, and e. When we reach the point where i1 and i2 diﬀer by a data point
d, we apply Lemma 4.3 knowing that an -unwinding family exists for the current
state s and d.
4.2 Example: Applying the Proof Technique
We now return to the system presented in Section 2.2 and modeled as a parametric
automaton Mex1(K) in Section 3.3. We will present an unwinding relation that
proves that the automaton has diﬀerential noninterference.
Given that the system uses -diﬀerentially private functions t times, one might
be surprised that we prove that it has (2t∗)-diﬀerential noninterference rather than
(t ∗ )-diﬀerential noninterference. This extra leakage comes from dealing with the
bounded memory of actual computers. In particular, each array in dPts is limited
to a length of maxPts. The program keeps track of the current number of data
points stored in each slot with the array numPts. If the current slot has reached
maxPts data points, the program drops any incoming data points until curSlot
advances. This dropping of data points introduces extra privacy leakage since a
single data point can have two eﬀects: (1) the data point is included in calculations
aﬀecting the probabilities of some outputs, and (2) the data point’s presence can
cause the system to drop a future data point and exclude it from calculations.
Thus, the system has only (2t ∗ )-diﬀerential noninterference. In many scenarios,
the possibility of running out of memory for storing data points is unrealistic. If
the number of data points can never reach the memory bound, then under this
assumption, one can show that system has (t ∗ )-diﬀerential noninterference. 3
To prove that the automaton has (2t ∗ )-diﬀerential noninterference, we show
that for anyK, every state s and data point d of Lex1(K) can be covered by a (2t∗)-
unwinding family R·s,d in the sense of Deﬁnition 4.4. Diﬀerential noninterference
will follow from Theorem 4.5.
For the (2t ∗ )-unwinding family R·s,d, we construct for each j in [0, t] the
unwinding relation R2j∗s,d . To construct these unwinding relations, we ﬁrst introduce
3 To avoid this extra privacy leakage, it may be tempting to use a linked list for each slot and keep track of
how many total data points are stored in all the slots combined. Then, the program could drop data points
only when all the memory is exhausted instead of just the current slot’s allocation. However, this change
would allow a single data point stored in one slot to aﬀect which data points are dropped from other slots
in the future. Thus, a single data point may have an unbounded eﬀect on future computation preventing
such a program from satisfying diﬀerential noninterference for any privacy bound.
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some notation.
For a state s = 〈pc,B,n, c, y, r, k〉 and d ∈ D, add(s, c′, d) adds d to the slot c′
of the state s. Formally,
add(s, c′, d) = 〈pc,B′,n, c, y, r, k〉
where B′ = B and n′ = n when nc = v and, otherwise, B
′
c = Bcunionmulti{d}, n
′
c = nc+1,
and for all c′ = c, B′c′ = Bc′ and n
′
c′ = nc′ .
The function swap replaces one data point with another. Formally,
swap(s, c′, d, d′) = 〈pc,B′,n, c, y, r, k〉
where B′c′ = Bc′ − {d
′} unionmulti {d} and B′c′′ = Bc′′ for all c
′′ = c′.
For j such that 0 ≤ j ≤ t, let Sj1 to be the set of all states s1 such that s1 is
reachable from s using t− j queries and any number of data points. Intuitively, this
means that from s1 one can pose j more queries until the privacy budget runs out
on the data point that is input into the system in state s. We deﬁne the relations
as follows:
• For j > 0, let R2j∗s,d to be such that for all s1 ∈ S
j
1, s1 R
2j∗
s,d add(s1, c, d) and
for all d′, s1 R
2j∗
s,d swap(s1, c, d, d
′) where s = 〈pc,B,n, c, y, r, k〉. That is, R2j∗s,d
relates a state to the states it could have become had it received d as input when
the curSlot was c, the value curSlot had in state s.
• For j = 0, R2j∗s,d is as above for states with a PC of 16 and is equality for those
with a PC of 08.
Lemma 4.6 For all sets K of functions such that each function in K has -
diﬀerential privacy, for all states s and for all data points d, R·s,d is a (2t ∗ )-
unwinding family for the automaton Mex1(K).
Our related technical report [45] holds the proof. The proof uses a case analysis
over the diﬀerent types of actions a that might be received by two related states.
The most interesting case is when a is a query and j = 1. In this case, s1 R
′
s,d s2
implies that s1 is in S
t−1
1 with s1 and s2 reached in t−1 queries. For a 2t∗  privacy
leakage bound, this corresponds to the last time d may be used in answering a
query. This requirement is met since for s1 and s2 to be reached with t− 1 queries,
by the construction of Mex1(K), curSlot in both states must be t − 1 slots away
from the slot that holds d. Thus, after answering the next query the slot curSlot,
whose value is always mod t, will point to the slot that holds d and that slot will
be rewritten removing d.
Since R2j∗s,d covers s and d for all states s and data points d of the automaton
Mex1(K), Lemma 4.6 and Theorem 4.5 implies that the automaton has (2t ∗ )-
diﬀerential noninterference.
Theorem 4.7 For all set of functions K such that each function in K has -
diﬀerential privacy, Mex1(K) has (2t ∗ )-diﬀerential noninterference.
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As count and sum are -diﬀerentially private functions, this implies that
Mex1({count, sum}) has (2t ∗ )-diﬀerential noninterference.
5 Related Work
Formal Veriﬁcation of Diﬀerential Privacy. The most closely related work to
ours is a programming language with a linear type system for proving that well-
typed programs in the language have diﬀerential privacy [38]. Later work applies
their type system to detecting network attacks in a private manner [37]. The usual
trade-oﬀs between a program analysis technique designed to work over standard
programming languages and a custom type system for a specialized language apply:
the type system makes explicit in the source code why the program has diﬀerential
privacy and type checking scales well, but the programmer must use a special-
purpose programming language and annotate the code as the type system requires.
Additionally, their programming language lacks I/O commands for creating inter-
active systems whereas our proof technique is for automata modeling interactive
systems.
Other Diﬀerential Privacy Deﬁnitions. The deﬁnition of diﬀerential pri-
vacy may be seen as largely a simpliﬁcation of the previously deﬁned notion of
-indistinguishability [17], which explicitly models interaction between a private
system and the data examiner as in our deﬁnition of diﬀerential noninterference.
Our deﬁnition, however, is cast in the framework of probabilistic automata rather
than Turing machines. This supports having structured models that are capable of
highlighting issues arising from the bounded memory of actual computers. Further-
more, we deal with non-termination using preﬁxes allowing us to leverage previous
work on formal methods for automata (e.g., [25]).
Diﬀerential privacy is a very active research ﬁeld giving rise to new deﬁnitions
and techniques at a fast pace [16,18]. For example, pan-privacy is a notion of
diﬀerential privacy that gives diﬀerential privacy against adversaries that can ob-
serve the internal state of a system, in addition to outputs [32]. Computational
diﬀerential privacy gives certain diﬀerential privacy guarantees against computa-
tionally bounded adversaries. Our deﬁnition of diﬀerential noninterference and
the formal proof technique was developed from the deﬁnition of Dwork [13]. We
think that our choice of probabilistic automata as a model would prove useful in
extending the work of this paper to these new deﬁnitions as well. For example, algo-
rithms such as stream-processing algorithms that have been subject to research from
pan-privacy point of view can be naturally modeled using probabilistic automata.
Similarly, probabilistic automata-based models have successfully been used in the
formal analysis of cryptographic protocols against computationally bounded adver-
saries [42,3,8].
Information-Flow Properties. Diﬀerential noninterference has some simi-
larities with information ﬂow properties such as noninterference [21]. The litera-
ture contains several works on the use of transition systems, observational equiv-
alences, and various notions of bisimulation relations to deﬁne information ﬂow
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properties. To name a few, Focardi and Gorrieri have developed a classiﬁcation
of noninterference-like properties in the unifying framework of a process algebra
in a non-probabilistic setting [19]. Sabelfeld and Sands [40], and Smith [43] have
used probabilistic bisimulation in deﬁning probabilistic noninterference for multi-
threaded programs, which they enforce using type systems. Probabilistic nonin-
terference is regarded by many to be too strong in practice since it requires the
probabilities of traces of the system observable by low-level users to be identical for
any pair of high-level inputs (data points in our setting) [23,24]. As noninterfer-
ence is often too strong of a requirement, weaker probabilistic versions have been
proposed that allow for some information leakage [36,2]. Di Pierro, Hankin, and
Wiklicky introduced approximate noninterference [36], and Backes and Pﬁtzmann
introduced computational probabilistic noninterference [2], both of which allow for
some information leakage. However, unlike diﬀerential noninterference, they do not
allow the system behavior to diverge as the diﬀerence between the high-level inputs
(data points) increases. This divergence, which is allowed by our diﬀerential nonin-
terference deﬁnition, is needed to release meaningful statistics and gain utility from
the data set as discussed in detail in Section 1.
Quantitative information ﬂow analysis attempts to determine how much infor-
mation a program provides an adversary about a sensitive input or class of inputs.
Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria present a formal model of programs for quantifying
information ﬂows and a static analysis that provides lower and upper bounds on
the amount of information that ﬂows [11]. They measure information ﬂow as the
mutual information between the high-level inputs and low-level outputs given that
the adversary has control over the low-level inputs. Malacaria extends this work
to handle loops [27], and Chen and Malacaria to multi-threaded programs [10].
McCamant and Ernst [28], and Newsome and Song [33] provide dynamic analy-
ses for quantitative information ﬂow using the mutual information formalization.
There is also recent work on eﬃcient computation of information leakage in the
information theoretic-sense using a probabilistic automaton model [1]. All of the
above approaches assume that the adversary’s beliefs are aligned with the actual
distribution producing the sensitive input(s) and that adversary has no additional
background knowledge. Clarkson, Myers, and Schneider instead propose a formu-
lation using the beliefs of the adversary [12]. However, such a formulation may be
diﬃcult to apply in practice because the surveyor may not know the adversary’s be-
liefs. An advantage of diﬀerential privacy is that no assumptions are needed about
the adversary’s auxiliary information, computational power, or beliefs.
Proof Techniques for Transition Systems. Simulation and bisimulation
provide a systematic proof technique for showing implementation and equivalence
relationships between two automata [31,26,41] and are related to unwinding (see
e.g., [7]). Most similar to our unwinding technique, Segala and Turrini have stud-
ied approximate simulation relations in the context of cryptographic protocols [42].
Their work diﬀers from ours by using asymptotic approximations and only execu-
tions of polynomial length in terms of a security parameter. Their work allows
certain transitions of the protocol to not have a matching transition in the speciﬁ-
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cation. This models the capability of the adversary to compromise correctness. A
protocol is deemed correct if the leakage accumulated at the end of a polynomial
length execution is exponentially small in some security parameter. Our unwind-
ing technique, on the other hand, requires that there always be an approximately
matching transition, uses an exact error bound, and considers executions of any
length. However, the probabilities of those transitions are only within some expo-
nential multiplicative factor of one another. Thus, neither approach subsumes the
other. Furthermore, our relations are over states whereas theirs is over preﬁxes of
executions.
6 Future Work
The results of this paper represent progress towards developing a basis for the
formal veriﬁcation of diﬀerential privacy for systems, but leave open several inter-
esting directions that we plan to explore in future work. While our related technical
report [45] provides an algorithm for mechanically checking a restricted class of rela-
tions from the proof technique, we hope, in addition, to create a decision procedure
for our proof technique by extending prior work on decision procedures for proba-
bilistic bisimulations [5,4,35,9] to make them produce a family of relations rather
than a single one. We also plan to extend the theory to model and reason about
higher level systems, such as computer systems of hospitals and other distributed
systems [39] that allow interactions of the system with data providers and with
data analysts, while protecting the privacy of the data stored and manipulated by
the system. For example, airavat allows computations over data distributed in a
cloud, and combines mandatory access control with diﬀerential privacy where dif-
ferential privacy is used to facilitate declassiﬁcation governed by the privacy error
bound set by a data provider. Our techniques can currently apply to the veriﬁca-
tion of diﬀerential privacy property of the airavat system using a whole-system
model. We are interested in exploring the computational model of airavat further
to understand the interplay between the ﬁne-grained access control mechanisms
and the diﬀerential privacy mechanisms in stating the end-to-end information-ﬂow
guarantee of airavat.
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